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Abstract
This paper analyses a suﬃcient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium in two-sided
matching with non-transferable utility. The condition is easy to interpret, being based
on the notion that a person’s characteristics both form the basis of their attraction to
the opposite sex, and determine their own sexual preferences.
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1. Introduction
In 1962 Gale and Shapley posed and solved “the stable marriage problem”,
which asks whether it is possible to pair the members of one set (men) with
members of another, disjoint, set (women), in such a way that no man and woman
who are not paired with each other would both prefer to leave their partners and
marry each other. Gale and Shapley proved that such an equilibrium, called a
stable matching, exists and they showed how to find it.
This paper is concerned with the uniqueness of equilibrium. I propose and
analyse a primitive condition on preferences that ensures a unique stable matching.
The central idea is based on the notion that a person’s characteristics, e.g. their
physical appearance, their personal qualities, or their productive capabilities, both
form the basis of their attraction to the opposite sex and determine who they
are attracted to. The condition I propose is called the No Crossing Condition
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(NCC). It has two components: firstly, we must be able to order completely any
group of men, M, and any group of women, W , the implication being that such
orderings are based on one or more personal characteristics which make up their
type; secondly, men further along the ordering of M tend to prefer women further
along the ordering of W,and vice versa. The exact sense of “tend to prefer” is
made clear in the next section, but the NCC encompasses two special cases: when
all members of one sex agree on their preferences for the other sex, and when each
person would prefer a partner who is similar to themselves1.
The next section of the paper sets up the formal matching framework, defines
the NCC, and proves the central theorem of the paper. Section 3 considers the re-
lationships between the No Crossing Condition and a condition recently proposed
by Eeckhout (2000). Section 4 concludes.
2. Uniqueness of Stable Matching
2.1. The Matching Framework
The standard matching framework considers two finite and disjoint sets, both
with n elements: a set of men M and a set of women W . We refer to P =M ∪W
as the population. Each man has complete, reflexive, and transitive preferences
over the set W . We assume that these preferences are strict (so that no man
is indiﬀerent between two women), and are such that each man would rather be
married to any woman than remain single. The preferences of a man x ∈ M can
thus be described by a binary relation Âx defined on the set W, the statement
y Âx y0 denoting that x prefers y to y0. Similar assumptions are made for women’s
preferences, mutatis mutandis, with the preferences of a woman y ∈ W described
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by a binary relation Ây defined on the set M . Let Φ = { Âi, i ∈ P} be the
preference profile (or set of preference relations) of the population M ∪W. The
triple (M,W,Φ) constitutes a marriage market.
Definition 1 A matching µ is a one-to-one function from P onto itself such that
(i) x = µ(y) if and only if y = µ(x); (ii) if x ∈ M then µ(x) ∈ W and if y ∈ W
then µ(y) ∈M.
Definition 2 A matching µ can be blocked by a pair (x, y) ∈ M ×W for whom
x 6= µ(y) if y Âx µ(x) and x Ây µ(y). A matching µ is stable if it cannot be
blocked by any pair.
Then we have:
Theorem 1 A stable matching exists for every marriage market.
Proof. See Gale and Shapley, 1962.
2.2. Ordering the sets M and W
The No Crossing Condition requires M and W to be ordered. The most
straightforward way to approach this is to consider M and W when ordered as
vectors (i.e. as ordered lists of the elements of M and W ) with diﬀerent orderings
represented by diﬀerent vectors. Let In = {1, 2, ..., n}.
Definition 3 The vector m = (mi) is an ordering of M if (i) m has n elements;
(ii) for all i ∈ In, mi ∈ M ; (iii) for all x ∈ M,x = mi for some i ∈ In; similarly
the vector w = (wi) is an ordering of W if (i) w has n elements; (ii) for all i ∈ In,
wi ∈W ; (iii) for all y ∈W,y = wi for some i ∈ In.
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We can now move easily from one ordering of M or W to another; this will be
useful when we analyse the relationship between the No Crossing Condition and
the condition proposed by Eeckhout (2000).
2.3. The No Crossing Condition
This may now be stated quite simply:
Definition 4 A population P =M ∪W with preference profile Φ satisfies the No
Crossing Condition (NCC) if there exists an ordering m of M and an ordering w
of W such that if i < j and k < l then
(i) it is not the case that both ml Âwi mk and mk Âwj ml;
(ii) it is not the case that both wj Âmk wi and wi Âml wj.
It is sometimes convenient to refer to the orderings m and w themselves as
satisfying the NCC. Part (i) of the definition may be interpreted as saying that
it cannot be the case that the woman further back in the female ordering (wi)
prefers the man further forward in the male ordering (ml) and at the same time
woman further forward in the female ordering (wj) prefers the man further back in
the male ordering (mk). Diagrammatically this rules out the preferences depicted
in Figure 1, where the sexes are ordered along the two horizontal lines, and the
arrow from each woman points to the man she prefers out of the two shown. If the
NCC is satisfied there exist orderings m and w such that for any pair of women
and any pair of men the two arrows representing the women’s preferences do not
cross, nor do the two arrows representing the men’s preferences.
The condition does not rule out the possibility that both women prefer the
same man; more generally it allows for all members of one sex to have the same
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Figure 1: Preferences ruled out by the No Crossing Condition
preferences. Nor does it necessarily imply ’single-peakedness’ of preferences”, given
the orderings m and w. For example if n = 3 the NCC does not forbid preferences
for w1 such that m3 Âw1 m1 Âw1 m2. However in this case the NCC rules out
eitherm1 Âw2 m3 orm2 Âw2 m, although it has nothing to say about w2’s ranking
of m1 and m2.
A very important property of the NCC is that if it holds for a population P
then it also holds for any sub-population of P with equal numbers of men and
women. Formally:
Lemma 1 Let the population P =M ∪W satisfy the No Crossing Condition and
let M 0 ⊂ M and W 0 ⊂ W, where #(M 0) = #(W 0) = n0; then the population
P 0 =M 0 ∪W 0 satisfies the No Crossing Condition.
Proof. See Appendix
2.3.1. No Crossing and the Existence of Fixed Pairs
We now develop two lemmas that lie at the heart of the main theorem on
uniqueness. If we can find any couple who love each other (where “love” means
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“prefer, out of the members of the opposite sex) then each such couple, called
a fixed pair, must be matched in equilibrium. The main theorem then uses the
No Crossing Condition to identify a sequence of n fixed pairs, thus generating a
unique equilibrium matching.
Definition 5 A couple (x, y) ∈ M × W is a fixed pair of the population P =
M ∪W if y Âx y0for all y0 ∈W\y and x Ây x0for all x0 ∈M\x.
The advantage of being able to identify fixed pairs is that any stable matching
of P must consist of the partnerships of the fixed pairs of P plus a stable matching
of the remainder of the population. Formally.
Lemma 2 Let µ be a stable matching of the population P = M ∪W which has p
fixed pairs (xi, yi), i ∈ Ip; let P 0 = M 0 ∪W 0, where M 0 = M\{x1, x2, ..., xp} and
W 0 =W\{y1, y2, ..., yp}; and let µ0 be a matching of the population P 0 defined by
µ0(z) = µ(z) for all z ∈ P 0 . Then (i) µ(xi) = yi for all i ∈ Ip; (ii) µ0 is a stable
matching of P 0.
Proof. See Appendix
The problem of finding a unique stable matching of the population P can thus
be broken down into finding the fixed pairs of P, and then finding a unique stable
matching of P 0. But this requires that P does indeed have at least one fixed pair:
enter the No Crossing Condition.
Lemma 3 If a population P = M ∪W satisfies the No Crossing Condition, then
it has a fixed pair.
Lemma 4 Proof. See Appendix.
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The proof considers the function that for each man x gives x’s rival , the pre-
ferred man of x’s preferred woman. Given orderings m and w satisfying the NCC,
this function is non-decreasing in the sense that if x is further along the ordering
m then x0s rival can be no further back in the ordering. The existence of a fixed
point, and hence of a fixed pair, is almost immediate. But there is no reason to
suppose that if mi and wk are a fixed pair then i = k. For example, the shortest
man and the tallest woman form a fixed pair if everyone prefers a partner as tall
as themselves and all men are taller than all women. Of course, the fixed point is
not necessarily unique.
2.4. The Main Theorem
Bringing together Lemmas 4, 5, and 6, we now have the main uniqueness result:
Theorem 2 If a population P =M ∪W satisfies the No Crossing Condition then
there exists a unique stable matching
Proof. See Appendix
The proof shows how to construct the unique stable matching: first match
the fixed pairs of P ; take the remaining population P2, match the fixed pairs of
P2; and so on, until the population is exhausted (perhaps literally). To illustrate
how the successive identification of fixed pairs leads to a unique stable matching,
consider the following example of a population of women with heights 1.50, 1.64,
1.69, 1.78, and men with heights 1.60, 1.67, 1.72, 1.80. Each individual would
prefer to be matched with someone as near to their own height as possible i.e.
someone of height h1 matched with someone of height h2 has utility that is a
negative function of |h1 − h2| .Such preferences satisfy the No Crossing Condition,
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•
• •• •
• • •
w1
=
1.50
m1
=
1.60
W
M
w2
=
1.64
w3
=
1.69
w4
=
1.78
m2
=
1.67
m3
=
1.72
m4
=
1.80
Figure 2: Preferences to illustrate Theorem 2
and are illustrated in Figure 2 (the arrows from each person point to her/his most
preferred partner.
The fixed pairs of this population are (w3,m2) and (w4,m4), so they are
matched in any stable matching. The remaining population, P2 = W2 ∪ M2,
equals {w1, w2,m1,m3}, with heights 1.50, 1.64, 1.60, and 1.72 respectively. P2
also satisfies the No Crossing Condition and the couple (w2,m1) are a fixed pair;
note that w2 would have preferred m2 but he is already matched with w3. Finally,
w1 and m3 are left and must be matched. This process by which new fixed pairs
emerge as others are taken out of the population is illustrated in Fig 3, where the
bold double arrows denote a fixed pair of the population or sub-population under
consideration.
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•
• •• •
• • •
w1
=
1.50
m1
=
1.60
W
M
w2
=
1.64
w3
=
1.69
w4
=
1.78
m2
=
1.67
m3
=
1.72
m4
=
1.80
•
• •
•
w1
=
1.50
m1
=
1.60
W2
M2
w2
=
1.64
m3
=
1.72
•
•
w1
=
1.50
W3
M3
m3
=
1.72
Figure 3: The emergence of fixed pairs, denoted by bold double arrows.
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3. No Crossing and Sequential Preferences
Recently, Eeckhout (2000) has suggested a suﬃcient condition for uniqueness.
Let m and w be orderings of M and W respectively, not necessarily satisfying the
NCC. Suppose that, for i < n, mi prefers wi to all the women from wi+1 to wn, and
wi prefers mi to all the men from mi+1 to mn. I call this the Sequential Preference
Condition (SPC), and for convenience refer to the orderings m and w as satisfying
the SPC. Then there is a unique stable matching in which mi is matched with wi,
for all i (Theorem 1 in Eeckhout, 2000). The equilibrium can be constructed by a
sequential process: m1 and w1 prefer each other above all others and so must be
paired in any stable matching (since they could block any matching in which they
were not paired); m2 and w2 prefer each other to anyone else in W\w1 andM\m1
respectively and hence must also be paired in equilibrium (since they could block
any matching in which they were not paired but m1 and w1 were paired); and so
on, until we are left with mn and wn, who would rather marry each other than
remain single.
A drawback of the Sequential Preference Condition is that it does not indicate
when or why it might be satisfied in any particular population. It applies a test to
the preference orderings of a given population, but gives no clue about the under-
lying structure of tastes that might result in the test being satisfied. Consequently
whether the SPC holds or not depends critically on the exact membership of the
setsW andM . For example, if we reduce both the number of men and the number
of women by one, the condition may no longer hold (unless we take out the ith
man and the ith woman). This possibility is illustrated in Table 1, which gives the
preferences of a population of three men and three women:
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agent 1st preference 2nd preference 3rd preference
m1 w1 w2 w3
m2 w2 w3 w1
m3 w1 w2 w3
w1 m1 m2 m3
w2 m1 m2 m3
w3 m3 m2 m1
Table 1
The SPC is satisfied and mi is matched with wi, 1 = 1, 2, 3. But if we take out
m1 and w2 and consider the population of M 0 = {m2,m3} and W 0 = {w1, w3}
then w1 prefers m2 who prefers w3 who prefers m3 who prefers w1, with the result
that both of the possible matchings are stable.
What is the relationship between the NCC and Eeckhout’s SPC? Let m and
w be orderings satisfying the NCC for a population P = M ∪W . Recall that
P satisfies the SPC if there exists orderings m0 and w0 such that for i < n, m0i
prefers w0i to all the women from w
0
i+1 to w
0
n, and w
0
i prefers m
0
i to all the men
from m0i+1 to m
0
n. If P satisfies the NCC, orderings m
0 and w0 satisfying the SPC
can be derived from the order in which the fixed pairs of P and its subpopulations
are generated in constructing the unique stable matching of P . In essence, the kth
elements of m0 and w0 must be the kth fixed pair in that sequence. More precisely,
consider the sequence of populations {Ps}, s = 1, ..., S such that Ps+1 = Ps\Fs,
with P1 = P, where Fs is the set of individuals who constitute the fixed pairs of
Ps. Each man in M and each woman in W is an element of only one set in the
sequence {Fs}. Let ns = #Fs/2 and Ns =
Ps
t=1 nt (so that NS = n) and set
N0 = 0. Then the vectors m0 and w0 satisfy the SPC if (i) they are orderings of
Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Two-sided Matching 12
M and W respectively and (ii) for any k ≤ n, m0k = mi and w0k = wj for some i,
j such that mi and wj are a fixed pair of Ps, where s is uniquely defined by the
condition Ns−1 < k ≤ Ns.
In short, the NCC implies the SPC, for a given population P. The reverse is
not true, as the example of Table 1 shows; the population P = M ∪W satisfies
the SPC, but not the NCC; if P did satisfy the NCC then so would its subset
P 0 =M 0 ∪W 0, which would ensure a unique stable matching of P 0.
An alternative view of the relationship between the NCC and the SPC is to
regard M and W as the sets of all possible men and women. In any particular
instance, we are therefore dealing with subsetsM 0 andW 0. From Lemma 1, if P =
M ∪W satisfies the NCC, so does P 0 =M 0∪W 0, so it is suﬃcient, when analysing
the population P 0, to show or assume that P satisfies the NCC. Moreover, when
considering the orderings m0 and w0 ofM 0 andW 0 that satisfy the NCC, the order
in which any two men or two women appear in m0 or w0 is independent of the
other elements in those vectors. In eﬀect, the orderings m and w of M and W
that satisfy the NCC may be treated as “master orderings”. But consider now
the emergence of fixed pairs as the stable matching is constructed (for example,
as in Fig.3). The positions in m0 and w0 of the first fixed pair, the second fixed
pair, and so on, may bear no resemblance to the order in which they emerge, and
will typically vary with the precise membership of M 0 and W 0. But it is the order
in which they emerge as fixed pairs that gives the orderings that satisfy the SPC.
Both theoretically and from an applied perspective, it seems an advantage that
the ordering satisfying the NCC is invariant to the particular groups M 0 and W 0
being considered.
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4. Conclusion
Uniqueness of equilibrium is a typically regarded as a desirable characteristic of
an economic model. It helps to make prediction and comparative statics sharp and
unambiguous. This paper shows that the standard model of two-sided matching
has a unique stable matching if agents’ preferences satisfy a condition, that is
both intuitively reasonable and easy to interpret, being based on the notion that a
person’s characteristics both form the basis of their attraction to the opposite sex,
and determine their own sexual preferences. If we are prepared to assume that
men and women can be ordered on the basis of their characteristics, and that men
further along the male ordering tend to prefer women further along the female
ordering, then the No Crossing Condition is satisfied and equilibrium is unique.
One application of the results of this paper may be found in Clark and Kanbur
(2002), which looks at the question of assortment in two-sided matching. One
possible interpretation of the NCC is that agents tend to prefer partners who
are similar to themselves. It might therefore be thought that in the equilibrium
matching like will match with like, resulting in positive assortment. Clark and
Kanbur show that this line of reasoning is incorrect and, using the NCC, show
how the degree of assortment depends on, inter alia, the distribution of agents
characteristics. They thus demonstrate how information about utility functions
can be used to see if the NCC is satisfied, regardless of the precise membership of
the two groups to be matched.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Take the orderings m and w that satisfy the NCC for
the population P , delete those elements corresponding to M\M 0 and W\W 0 to
form the n0 dimensional vectors m0and w0. Then since m0 and w0 must continue
to satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 4 they are orderings that satisfy the
NCC for the population P 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. If (i) is not satisfied then µ can be blocked by one of
the fixed pairs (xi, yi) i ∈ In0 and hence cannot be stable, a contradiction. If (i) is
satisfied but not (ii), then there exists a pair (x0, y0) ∈M 0 ×W 0, with x0 6= µ0(y),
who can block the matching µ0 i.e. y0 Âx0 µ0(x0) and x0 Ây0 µ0(y0). The definition
of µ0 (µ0(z) = µ(z) for all z ∈ P 0) implies that µ0(x0) = µ(x0) and µ0(y0) = µ(y0)
for all y0 ∈ W 0 , so that y0 Âx0 µ(x0) and x0 Ây0 µ(y0). This means that the pair
(x0, y0) can block the matching µ,and hence µ cannot be stable, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3. For any man x ∈M, let f(x) ∈W denote his preferred
woman in W ; i.e. f(x) Âx y for all y ∈ W\f(x). Since preferences are complete
and strict, f(x) exists and is unique. Similarly, for any woman y ∈W, let g(y) ∈M
denote her preferred man in M ; i.e. g(y) Ây x for all x ∈W\g(y). g(y) also exists
and is unique. Let m and w be orderings ofM and W satisfying the NCC for P =
M∪W. For each element of m the function f specifies an element of w; this in turn
defines a function φ : In → In as follows: if f(mk) = wi then φ(k) = i, which may
be read as “the kth man prefers the ith woman”. Compare the preferences of mk
and ml, where k < l . If f(mk) = f(ml) then φ(k) = φ(l). If f(mk) 6= f(ml), then
φ(k) 6= φ(l) and wφ(k) Âmk wφ(l); but if φ(l) < φ(k) then part (ii) of Definition
4 of the NCC, with i = φ(l) and j = φ(k), implies that wφ(k) Âml wφ(l), a
clear contradiction. Hence if k < l then φ(k) ≤ φ(l) i.e. the function φ is non-
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decreasing. A similar argument applies to the function γ : In → In, defined as
follows: if g(wi) = mk then γ(i) = k; if i < j then γ(i) ≤ γ(j) i.e. the function
γ is non-decreasing. Now, consider the composition of φ and γ, the function
ρ(k) = γ(φ(k)); this gives the position, in the ordering m, of the preferred man
of the kth man’s preferred woman (the kth man’s rival); i.e. mρ(k) = g(f(mk)).
Since φ and γ both map In into In and are non-decreasing the function ρ also
maps In into In and is non-decreasing. It therefore has a fixed point k∗ = ρ(k∗).
Let i∗ = φ(k∗); then k∗ = γ(i∗); thus wi∗ = f(mk∗) and mk∗ = g(wi∗); i.e. mk∗
and wi∗ are a fixed pair.
Remark. The proof of Lemma 3 could have proceeded by considering the
composition of γ and φ, the function κ(i) = φ(γ(i)) (the ith woman’s rival) .
Clearly if k∗ is a fixed point of ρ, then i∗ = φ(k∗) is a fixed point of κ.
Proof of main theorem. We consider a sequence of populations {Ps}, s =
1, ..., S such that Ps+1 = Ps\Fs, with P1 = P, where Fs is the set of individuals
who constitute the fixed pairs of Ps; i.e. if (x, y) is a fixed pair of Ps then {x, y} ⊆
Fs. S is defined by the condition PS = FS . Since Fs is unique given Ps, the
sequence {Ps} is uniquely defined. By the repeated application of Lemmas 1 and
3, each element in the sequence {Ps} satisfies the No Crossing Condition and has
at least one fixed pair. Thus Ps+1 is a proper subset of Ps, and since P is finite S
exists and is finite.
Let µ be any stable matching of P, and for all s ∈ IS , let µs be a matching of
Ps defined by µs(z) = µ(z) for all z ∈ Ps; i.e. µs is the matching µ as it applies
to the population Ps. Lemma 2 , part (ii), says that if µs is a stable matching of
Ps then µs+1 is a stable matching of Ps+1. But since µ = µ1is a stable matching
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of P = P1, this implies that for all s ∈ IS , µs is stable,. Then by Lemma 2, part
(i), for all s ∈ IS , x = µs(y) for any fixed pair (x, y) of Ps; and hence, given the
definition of µs, we have x = µ(y) for any fixed pair (x, y) of Ps and for all s ∈ IS .
But since P = ∪Ss=1Fs every individual in P is a member of some fixed pair of some
population Ps and is therefore matched by µ with the other member of the fixed
pair. Since the sequence {Ps} and the associated sequence{Fs} are independent of
the choice of which stable matching µ of P we consider, the matching µ is uniquely
determined.
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for the other sex, but when each person would prefer a partner who is similar to
themselves positive assortment is only one of many possibilities
